Ne Win

By Lee Kwan Yew



My first visit to Rangoon (Yangon) was in April 1962.

Burma was one of the better-endowed countries of Southeast Asia, a rice and food exporter before the war. However, the democratic system of government did not work. The people were of not one race, speaking one language. The British had brought together into one country a whole host of different races occupying different parts of this mountainous country.

The Burmese way to socialism was Ne Win¡¦s motto for the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma. His policy was simple: achieve self reliance and get rid of the Indians and Chinese who had come into Burma with the British.

My next visit to Rangoon was in May 1965, after a conference for Asian socialists in Bombay. Ne Win Liked that part of my speech where I had said, ¡§If we approach Asian problems of poverty and underdevelopment through the rosy spectacles of the Western European socialists, we are surely to fail.¡¨ I did not realize at that time how determined he was to be self-sufficient, to have little to do with the outside world, and to return to a romantic, idyllic past when Burma was rich and self-sufficient.

When Ne Win visited Singapore in 1974, I suggested we should coordinate our policies to get the United States, China and the Soviet Union to maintain a presence in the region, so as to have some power balance. He was not in the least interested, preferring to leave these matters to the superpowers.

I last visited Rangoon in January 1986. Ne Win had an excellent recall of events that happened 15 to 30 years ago. Over dinner, I found that despite Burma¡¦s 20 years of economic stagnation, he was as distrustful of foreign powers as ever. He spoke of being locked in a ¡§battle of wits¡¨ against elements outside Burma who wanted to make as much as they could at the expense of his country.

When his Prime minister, Maung Maung Kha, visited Singapore in September 1986, I tried to interest him in tourism, telling him of an article I had read in the Singapore American, in which two teachers from the American School described their visit to Rangoon, Mandalay and Pagan. I suggested that he opened up Burma, build hotels and get safe aircraft to fly from Rangoon to Mandalay and Pagan. He would get large numbers of tourists and considerable revenue. He listened quietly but said little. Nothing happened. Ne Win did not want foreigners in Burma.

Only in 1993, when Lieutenant General Kuin Nyunt, one of their key leaders, saw me in Singapore did I find a leader who was responsive, probably becauseNe Win had had a change of heart. Ne Win must have told him that I was an old friend because he listened quietly as I explained that Myanmar had to adjust to the post-Cold War world, open up its economy and develop the whole country. I pointed to China and Vietnam, two examples of former closed countries that were developing their tourism and inviting foreign investors to create jobs and wealth.

Khin Nyunt was then in charge of intelligence and the strongman of the junta or SLORC. I asked him to consider his policy toward Aung San Suu Kyi, the daughter of Burma¡¦s hero and first prime minister, Aung San. She had married an Englishman but had returned to Myanmar to lead a movement against the military government. They could not lock her up forever; she would be a continuing embarrassment to their government.

Myanmar had to improve the lives of the people, co-opt capable people with experience abroad into the government. A government of military officers could never get the economy going. I suggested he should make it possible for Singapore to engage and help Myanmar economically. Singapore could defend its position internationally, if this engagement was to help Myanmar return normalcy, not to maintain the present system.

When General Than Shwe, the Myanmar prime minister and chairman of SLORC, visited Singapore in June 1995, I suggested that he visit Indonesia to learn how it had changed from a military leadership, with General Suharto in charge, to an elected presidency. The Indonesian constitution gave the army a direct role in government, with representation in the legislature under a system called dwi-fungsi (two functions). The Indonesian army had a constitutional role in ensuring the security and integrity of the country. Elections for the president and the legislature were held every five years. Myanmar had to go in that direction if it wanted to be like the other countries in Southeast Asia.

I had called on Ne Win when he visited Singapore for medical treatment a year earlier, in 1994. He talked about his peace and serenity of mind through his practice of meditation. For two years after he withdrew from government in 1988, he had been in torment, fretting and worrying about what was going on in the country. Then in 1990 he began to read about meditation. He now spent many hours each day, in the morning, afternoon and evening, in silent meditation. He certainly looked much better than the sickly person I had met in Rangoon in 1986.

He was in Singapore again in 1997 to see his doctors. At the age of 86, he looked even better than on his last visit. This time he spoke only about meditation, giving me advice on how I could improve my meditation. I asked if he did not worry about the sickness of his loved ones, like children and grandchildren. Yes he did, but he could control, reduce, and forgot these sufferings through meditation. Did he not worry when his old generals asked for his advice? No, he replied; when they did this, he told them never to talk about their work because he had retired from the troubles of this world. However, diplomats told me he commanded respect and authority within the military and could still wield influence.

The West, especially the United States, believed that economic sanctions could force the government to hand power to Aung San Suu Kyi, who had won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1991. I did not think this was likely. The army has been Myanmar¡¦s only instrument of government since Ne Win took power in 1962. The military leaders can be persuaded to share power and gradually civilianize the government But unless the United States or the United Nations is prepared to send in arm forces to hold the country together, as it is doing in Bosnia, Myanmar without the army would be ungovernable. The West is impatient with Asean¡¦s constructive engagement and was puzzled when its leaders admitted Myanmar as a member in July 1997. But what better way was there to have the country develop, open up and gradually change? In Cambodia, a UN force that supervised elections could not install the winner into government because the de facto government under Hun Sen controlled the army, the police and the administration.

The generals will eventually have to adjust and change to a form of government more like their Asean neighbors¡¦. This will come about sooner if their contacts with the international community increase.



Excerpt from ¡§From Third World to First: The Singapore Story: 1965-2000 by Lee Kwan Yew¡¨